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Abstract
In this paper we show that the continuum time version of the Minority Game
satisfies the criteria for the application of a theorem on the existence of an invariant
measure. We consider the special case of a game with “sufficiently” asymmetric initial
condition where the number of possible choices for each individual is S = 2 and
Γ < +∞. An upper bound for the asymptotic behavior, as the number of agents grows
to infinity, of the waiting time for reaching the stationary state is then obtained.
1 Introduction
The Minority Game (MG) [6] is a simple model based on Arthur’s “El Farol” bar problem
[1] which describes the behavior of a group of competing heterogeneous agents subject to
the economic law of supply and demand. An application of the MG is, for example, the
microscopic modeling of financial markets [2, 3, 4, 10].
In this paper the attention is focused on the continuum time version of the MG (see
perhaps [5, 7]), where the number of possible choices for each individual is S = 2. In
particular we are interested in studying its long time behavior, in terms of existence of an
invariant measure for its dynamical variables and convergence of the dynamical variables
distribution to it.
Let us fix some notations, coherent with those used in [11]. Consider the MG with
N agents. Its dynamics is defined in terms of dynamical variables Us,i(t) in discrete
time t = 0, 1, . . .; these are scores corresponding to each of the possible agents choices
s = +1,−1. Each agent takes a decision si(t) with
Prob{si(t) = s} =
eΓiUs,i(t)∑
s′ e
ΓiUs′,i(t)
where Γi > 0. The original MG corresponds to Γi =∞ and was generalized to Γi = Γ <∞
[5]; here we consider the latter case.
The public information variable µ(t) is given to all agents; it belongs to the set of
integers {1, . . . , P} and can either be the binary encoding of last M winning choices or
drawn at random from a uniform distribution; here we consider the latter case.
The action a
µ(t)
si(t),i
of each agent depends on its choice si(t) and on µ(t). The coefficients
aµs,i, called strategies, are uniform random variables taking values ±1 (Prob{a
µ
s,i = ±1} =
1/2) independent on i, s and µ.
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Let us introduce the following random variables (to ease the notation the choices +1
and −1 are shorted with + and −)
ξµi =
aµ+,i − a
µ
−,i
2
, Θµ =
N∑
i=1
aµ+,i + a
µ
−,i
2
and their averages
ξiΘ =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
ξµi Θ
µ, ξiξj =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j .
The only relevant quantity in the dynamics is the difference between the scores of the two
strategies:
yi(t) = Γ
U+,i(τ)− U−,i(τ)
2
,
where τ = tΓ .
Let (Ω,F ,P) be the probability space respect to which all our random variables are
defined, y = (yi)1≤i≤N , Θ = (Θ
µ)1≤µ≤P and ξ = (ξi)1≤i≤N .
As shown in [11], if P/N = α ∈ R+, S = 2 and Γi = Γ > 0 for all i, the dynamics of
the continuum time limit of the MG is given by the following N -dimensional stochastic
differential equation
dyi(t) =

−ξiΘ− N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj)

 dt+Ai(y,N,Γ, ξ)dW (t), i = 1, . . . , N (1)
where
W (t) is an N -dimensional Wiener process,
Ai is the i-th row of the N ×N matrix A = (Aij) such that
(AA′)ij(y,N,Γ, ξ) =
Γσ2N,Γ(y)
αN
ξiξj.
If α > αc, where αc = 0.3374 . . . marks the transition point from a symmetric (α < αc)
to an asymmetric phase (α > αc) characterized, respectively, by no predictability and
predictability (in the asymmetric phase the choices +1 and −1 do not appear with equal
probabilities for a given µ(t)), then the function σ2N,Γ : R
N → R+ is continuous and
lim
N→∞
sup
y∈RN
σ2N,Γ(y)
N
≤ 1,
(see [5, 11]).
In [11] the authors derive the full stationary distribution of y. Here, by proving that
equation (1) satisfies the criteria for the application of Veretennikov’s Theorem (see [13]),
we show for the continuum time version of the MG with S = 2, “sufficiently” asymmetric
initial condition, Γ < +∞ and α > αc, that, for N sufficiently large, the distribution
ν(t) of y converges almost surely with polynomial rate to an invariant measure νinv and
that the waiting time for reaching the stationary state is at most O(|y(0)|2). For finite
2
asymmetric initial condition this means that the waiting time is at most O(N) or, since
P
N = α > 0, O(
P
α ).
The work is organized as follows. In section 2 some preliminary computations useful to
characterize the asymptotic behavior of the drift coefficient of equation (1) are performed.
In section 3 Veretennikov’s Theorem is applied to equation (1) with both finite and maxi-
mally (|y(0)| → ∞) asymmetric initial condition and an upper bound for limiting behavior
as N grows to infinity of the waiting time for reaching the stationary state is obtained.
In section 4 some conclusions are drawn, while Appendix contains the Veretennikov’s
Theorem.
2 Preliminaries
Let us start by proving some preliminary results showing that, despite the fact that the
coefficients present in the drift term of equation (1) are random variables assuming both
negative and positive values, as N grows to infinity the behavior of equation (1) becomes
dissipative and hence suitable to the application of a stability theorem, like the Vereten-
nikov’s one. For the sake of simplicity in notation, let us assume P = N , i.e. α = 1. The
results obtained still hold for any α > 0. From now on, when defining a probability event
we shall omit to explicit the dependence of the random variables on the ωs ∈ Ω.
Lemma 2.1 For every i = 1, 2, . . .
P

 limN→∞ ξiΘ = 0 ∧ limN→∞ ξ2i = a ∧ limN→∞
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ξiξj = 0

 =
P
{
lim
N→∞
ξ2i = a
}
,
where a is any constant.
Proof
Obviously, for every i
P

 limN→∞ ξiΘ = 0 ∧ limN→∞ ξ2i = a ∧ limN→∞
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ξiξj = 0

 ≤
P
{
lim
N→∞
ξ2i = a
}
.
It remains hence to show that also the inverse inequality holds.
For every i,
P

 limN→∞ ξiΘ = 0 ∧ limN→∞ ξ2i = a ∧ limN→∞
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ξiξj = 0

 =
P

 limN→∞

 1
N
N∑
µ=1

(aµ+,i)2 − (aµ−,i)2
4
+ ξµi
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
aµ+,j + a
µ
−,j
2



 = 0 ∧ lim
N→∞
ξ2i = a
∧ lim
N→∞
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
1
N
N∑
µ=1
ξµi ξ
µ
j = 0

 . (2)
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Since {ξµi }µ,i is a family of independent (on both µ and i) random variables identically
distributed over the set {−1, 0, 1} and since (aµ+,i)
2− (aµ−,i)
2 = 0, the right hand side term
of (2) is greater than or equal to
P

 limN→∞ 1N
N∑
µ=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
aµ+,j + a
µ
−,j
2
= 0 ∧ lim
N→∞
ξ2i = a ∧ lim
N→∞
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
1
N
N∑
µ=1
ξµj = 0

 =
P
{
lim
N→∞
ξ2i = a
}
P

 limN→∞ 1N
N∑
µ=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
aµ+,j + a
µ
−,j
2
= 0 ∧ lim
N→∞
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
1
N
N∑
µ=1
ξµj = 0

 .
Let ηj =
∑N
µ=1 ξ
µ
j and ζj =
∑N
µ=1
aµ
+,j+a
µ
−,j
2 (ηj and ζj both depend on N , but since for ev-
eryN , E[ηj] = E[ζj] = 0 we omit to explicitly write theN dependence);
{
ηj + ζj =
∑N
µ=1 a
µ
+,j
}
j
is a family of independent identically distributed random variables with mean E[ηj+ ζj] =
0.
Since by the Law of Large Numbers (LLN)
P

 limN→∞ 1N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(ηj + ζj) = 0

 = 1 P

 limN→∞ 1N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ηj = 0

 = 1,
it follows that
P

 limN→∞ 1N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ζj = 0

 = 1
and the thesis follows.

Lemma 2.2 For every i = 1, 2, . . .
P
{
lim
N→∞
ξ2i =
1
2
}
= 1.
Proof
Since E[(ξµi )
2] = 12 , it is a consequence of the LLN.

Lemma 2.3 For every i = 1, 2, . . .
P

 limN→∞ ξiΘ = 0 ∧ limN→∞ ξ2i = 12 ∧ limN→∞
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ξiξj = 0

 = 1.
Proof
It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2.

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Lemma 2.4 Let
Bi =

 limN→∞ ξ2i = 12
∧
j=1,2,...,j 6=i
lim
N→∞
ξiξj = 0


i = 1, 2, . . .
Then
P

 ⋂
i=1,2,...
Bi

 = 1.
Proof
For every i = 1, 2, . . .
P (Bi) ≥ P

 limN→∞ ξ2i = 12
∧
j=1,2,...,j 6=i
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
µ=1
ξµj = 0


= P
{
lim
N→∞
ξ2i =
1
2
} ∏
j=1,2,...,j 6=i
P

 limN→∞ 1N
N∑
µ=1
ξµj = 0

 = 1, (3)
where last equality is due to Lemma 2.2 and the LLN.
Let
D1 = B1, Di = Bi ∩Bi−1, i = 2, 3, . . .
Obviously P (D1) = P (B1) = 1. Under the inductive hypothesis P (Di−1) = 1; by (3)
P (Di) = P (Di−1 ∩Bi) = P (Bi|Di−1)P (Di−1) = 1.
Since {Di}i∈N is a decreasing sequence
P

 ⋂
i=1,2,...
Bi

 = P

 ⋂
i=1,2,...
Di

 = lim
i→∞
P (Di) = 1.

Let us define the following events:
A1 =

 limN→+∞ limx1→±∞ 1N

ξ1Θx1 + ξ21 tanh(x1)x1 +
N∑
j=2
ξ1ξj tanh(xj)x1

 = 1
2

 ,
Ai =

 limN→+∞ lim|x|→∞ 1N

ξiΘxi + ξ2i tanh(xi)xi +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ξiξj tanh(xj)xi

 ∈ [0, 1
2
]

i = 2, 3 . . .
and
E1 = A1, Ei = Ai ∩Ei−1, i = 2, 3, . . .
Lemma 2.5 For every i = 1, 2, . . .,
P (Ai) = 1.
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Proof
Since
lim
N→+∞
lim
x1→±∞
tanh(x1)x1
N
= 1 and lim
x1→±∞,xj→±∞
tanh(x1)x1
tanh(xj)x1
= ±1
by Lemma 2.3, P (A1) = 1. About to the Ai, i=2,3,. . . , if xi → ±∞, obviously P (Ai) = 1.
If xi 6= ±∞, since tanh is a bounded odd function, by Lemma 2.3, P (Ai) = 1.

Lemma 2.6 For every i = 1, 2, . . .,
P (Ei) = 1.
Proof
The proof is the same of Lemma 2.4 with Ei and Ai instead of Di and Bi.

3 Convergence to the Invariant Measure
In this section we show that, for N sufficiently large, the distribution of the random
variable y, the score differences vector whose dynamics is described by the stochastic
differential equation (1), admits an invariant measure and we study the limiting behavior
of the waiting time for reaching the stationary state.
For this purpose we perform an opportune rescaling of the variable y and show that the
dynamics of the rescaled variable z satisfies the criteria for the application of Veretennikov’s
Theorem (Theorem 5.1 in Appendix or see [13]). As a second step we extend the thesis of
Veretennikov’s Theorem to the original random variable y.
The Veretennikov’s Theorem gives, under quite general regularity assumptions, a con-
dition that suffices the existence of an invariant measure and the convergence to it for the
distribution of a random variable satisfying a stochastic differential equation. The criteria
for the application of such a theorem to a stochastic differential equation are based on the
evaluation of the drift term on the initial condition that must be such that |y(0)| 6= 0; this
means that we must avoid a game where all the agents have symmetric initial condition
(i.e. y(0) = 0). We focus our attention on two cases: a game where there exists at least
one agent having maximally asymmetric initial condition (|yi(0)| → ∞) and no matter
about the other agents (they can or not have symmetric initial condition) and a game
where |y(0)| <∞ and the number of agents with asymmetric initial condition (yi(0) 6= 0)
is O(N). The former situation corresponds to a game where there is at least one agent
playing always the same strategy since the beginning (a so called producer), while the
latter one corresponds to a game where the number of agents perceiving a strategy more
successful that the other one since the begging is O(N).
Let bNi (ξ,Θ, x) : ({−1, 0, 1}
P×N ,RP ,RN )→ R defined as
bNi (ξ,Θ, x) = ξiΘ+
N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(xj),
i = 1, 2, . . . , N
6
and
bN (ξ,Θ, x) =
(
bNi (ξ,Θ, x)
)
1≤i≤N
.
Equation (1) can be written in the form
dy(t) = −bN (ξ,Θ, y)dt+A(y,N,Γ, ξ)dW (t). (4)
bN (ξ,Θ, y) is obviously a Borel-measurable locally bounded function.
Let c be a bounded constant (that may depend on N) greater than 1 and z = cy;
under this rescaling of the variable y equation (4) becomes
dz(t) = −cbN
(
ξ,Θ,
z
c
)
dt+ cA
(z
c
,N,Γ, ξ
)
dW (t). (5)
Before going to study the limiting behavior of equation (5) as N grows to infinity, let us
prove the nondegeneracy of the the diffusion matrix A, a condition for the application of
Veretennikov’s Theorem.
Proposition 3.1 There exists Nˆ > 0 such that for every N > Nˆ the diffusion matrix A
is almost surely nondegenerate.
Proof
Nondegenerancy is equivalent to the following condition
inf
y
inf
ξ
inf
|x|=1
xAA′(y,N,Γ, ξ)x′ > 0
where Γ is fixed and x ∈ RN .
Since σ2N,Γ > 0 it is sufficient to show that
P


lim
N→∞


ξ21 ξ1ξ2 · · · ξ1ξN
ξ2ξ1 ξ22 · · · ξ2ξN
...
...
...
...
ξNξ1 ξNξ2 · · · ξ2N

 = aI


= 1
where a is a positive constant and I is the identity matrix.
This follows from Lemma 2.4 and hence we obtain the thesis.

3.1 Minority Game with maximally asymmetric initial condition
We consider a game where there exists at least one producer, that is an agent i such that
|yi(0)| → ∞. We show that, under an appropriate choice of the constant c, system (5)
satisfies the criteria for the application of Veretennikov’s Theorem and then we extend the
results of Theorem 5.1 to the original system (4). To ease the notation let y(0) = x.
Proposition 3.2
P
{
lim
N→∞
lim
|x|→∞
〈
bN (ξ,Θ, x), x
〉
N
≥
1
2
}
= 1.
Proof
7
P{
lim
N→∞
lim
|x|→+∞
〈
bN (ξ,Θ, x), x
〉
N
≥
1
2
}
=
P

 limN→+∞ lim|x|→+∞ 1N
N∑
i=1

ξiΘxi + ξ2i tanh(xi)xi +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ξiξj tanh(xj)xi

 ≥ 1
2

 =
P


∞∑
i=1
lim
N→+∞
lim
|x|→+∞
1
N

ξiΘxi + ξ2i tanh(xi)xi +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ξiξj tanh(xj)xi

 ≥ 1
2

 ≥
P

 ⋂
i=1,2,...
Ai

 = P

 ⋂
i=1,2,...
Ei

 .
Since {Ei}i∈N is a decreasing sequence,
P

 ⋂
i=1,2,...
Ei

 = lim
i→+∞
P (Ei) .
By applying Lemma 2.6 the thesis follows.

Corollary 3.1 There exist N˜ > 0 and M0 > 0 such that for every N > N˜〈
bN (ξ,Θ, x),
x
|x|
〉
>
(
N
2
− 1
)
1
|x|
|x| ≥M0 a.s.
Proof
It is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.2.

Proposition 3.3 Equation (5) with c > 1 + 2N
2
−1
satisfies a.s. condition (12) with r =
c
(
N
2 − 1
)
> N2 + 1.
Proof
It is an immediate consequence of Corollary 3.1 and Proposition 3.1.

In Proposition 3.4 Veretennikov’s Theorem is applied to equation (5), while the exis-
tence of an invariant measure for y and the rate of convergence to it is derived in Corollary
3.2.
Proposition 3.4 Let ν(t) be the distribution of z(t) = (zi(t))1≤i≤N satisfying equation
(5) with initial condition z(0) and c > 1 + 2N
2
−1
. For N sufficiently large, there exists a.s.
an invariant measure νinv for z such that
|ν(t)− νinv| ≤ m(1 + |z(0)|
l)(1 + t)−(k+1),
where m is a positive constant, 0 < k < c
(
N
2 − 1
)
− N2 − 1, 2k + 2 < l < 2c
(
N
2 − 1
)
−N
and |ν(t)− νinv| is the total variation distance between ν(t) and νinv, i.e. |ν(t)− νinv| :=
supA∈B
Rd
|ν(t)(A) − νinv(A)|.
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Proof
It is a consequence of Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 5.1.

Corollary 3.2 Let ν ′(t) be the distribution of y(t) = (yi(t))1≤i≤N satisfying equation (4)
with initial condition y(0) and let c = 1 + 2N
2
−1
+ 2
(N2 −1)
2 . For N sufficiently large, there
exists a.s. an invariant measure ν ′inv for y such that
|ν ′(t)− ν ′inv| ≤ m
′(1 + |cy(0)|l)(1 + t)−(k+1), (6)
where m′ is a positive constant, 0 < k < 2N
2
−1
and 2k + 2 < l < 2 + 4N
2
−1
.
Proof
Since the limit as N grows to infinity of c is 1 and z = cy, for N sufficiently large
|ν ′(t)− ν ′inv| = m
′|ν(t)− νinv| and the thesis follows from Proposition 3.4.

3.2 Minority Game with finite asymmetric initial condition
Now we move to a game where |y(0)| < ∞ and the number of agents with asymmetric
initial condition (yi(0) 6= 0) is O(N).
Let y(0) = x andN ′ = # {yi : yi(0) 6= 0} and suppose thatN
′ = O(N), i.e. limN→∞
N ′
N =
γ, 0 < γ ≤ 1; moreover let βi = tanh(xi)xi and β = min{βi : βi 6= 0}. To ease the notation,
let us suppose that x1 is such that β = tanh(x1)x1.
Proposition 3.5
P
{
lim
N→∞
〈
bN (ξ,Θ, x), x
〉
N
≥
1
2
βγ
}
= 1.
Proof
P
{
lim
N→∞
〈
bN (ξ,Θ, x), x
〉
N
≥
1
2
βγ
}
=
P

 limN ′→∞ γN ′
N ′∑
i=1

ξiΘxi + ξ2i tanh(xi)xi +
N ′∑
j=1,j 6=i
ξiξj tanh(xj)xi

 ≥ 1
2
βγ

 ≥
P

 limN ′→∞

ξ1Θx1 + ξ21 tanh(x1)x1 +
N ′∑
j=1,j 6=1
ξ1ξj tanh(xj)x1

 = 1
2
β

 = 1,
where last equality is a consequence of Lemma 2.3.

Corollary 3.3 There exist N˜ > 0 and M0 > 0 such that for every N > N˜〈
bN (ξ,Θ, x),
x
|x|
〉
> βγ
(
N
2
− 1
)
1
|x|
|x| ≥M0 a.s.
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Proof
It is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.5.

Proposition 3.6 If 0 < βγ ≤ 1, then equation (5) with c > 1βγ
(
1 + 2N
2
−1
)
satisfies a.s.
condition (12) with r = c
(
N
2 − 1
)
> N2 + 1.
Proof
It is an immediate consequence of Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.1.

In Proposition 3.7 Veretennikov’s Theorem is applied to equation (5), while the exis-
tence of an invariant measure for y and the rate of convergence to it is derived in Corollary
3.4.
Proposition 3.7 Let ν(t) be the distribution of z(t) = (zi(t))1≤i≤N satisfying equation
(5) with initial condition z(0) and c > 1βγ
(
1 + 2N
2
−1
)
with 0 < βγ ≤ 1. For N sufficiently
large, there exists a.s. an invariant measure νinv for z such that
|ν(t)− νinv| ≤ m(1 + |z(0)|
l)(1 + t)−(k+1),
where m is a positive constant, 0 < k < c
(
N
2 − 1
)
−N2 −1 and 2k+2 < l < 2c
(
N
2 − 1
)
−N .
Proof
It is a consequence of Proposition 3.6 and Theorem 5.1.

Corollary 3.4 Let ν ′(t) be the distribution of y(t) = (yi(t))1≤i≤N satisfying equation (4)
with initial condition y(0) and let c = 1βγ
(
1 + 2N
2
−1
+ 2
(N2 −1)
2
)
with 0 < βγ ≤ 1. For N
sufficiently large, there exists a.s. an invariant measure ν ′inv for y such that
|ν ′(t)− ν ′inv| ≤ m
′(1 + |cy(0)|l)(1 + t)−(k+1), (7)
where m′ is a positive constant, 0 < k <
(
N
2 + 1
) (
1
βγ − 1
)
+ 1βγ
2
N
2
−1
and 2k + 2 < l <
N
(
1
βγ − 1
)
+ 2βγ +
2
βγ
2
N
2
−1
.
Proof
Since the limit as N grows to infinity of c is 1βγ and z = cy, for N sufficiently large
|ν ′(t)− ν ′inv| = m
′|ν(t)− νinv| and the thesis follows from Proposition 3.7.

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3.3 Waiting time for reaching the stationary state
Corollaries 3.2 and 3.4 provide a rate of convergence toward the invariant distribution for
the score differences distribution; by making explicit t from (6) and (7), it is hence possible
to obtain the limiting behavior as N grows to infinity of the waiting time for reaching the
stationary state. Being the criteria for the application of Veretennikov Theorem sufficient
conditions for the existence of an invariant measure, the waiting time obtained may not
be the smallest one, and hence we have to talk of upper bound of the waiting time for
reaching the stationary state.
Since the scores time is the y’s time rescaled by Γ, i.e. yi(t) = Γ
U+,i(t/Γ)−U−,i(t/Γ)
2 ,
in studying the waiting time for reaching a stationary state for the MG we have to refer
to the time τ = tΓ , that is the own time of the scores Us,i corresponding to each agents
possible choices s = +1,−1.
In Proposition 3.8 the asymptotic behavior of the waiting time for reaching the sta-
tionary state both for a MG with maximally and finite asymmetric initial condition is
obtained.
Proposition 3.8 For every ǫ > 0 let T be such that
m′(1 + |cy(0)|l)(1 + TΓ)−(k+1) = ǫ,
where l and k are as in Corollaries 3.2 and 3.4 (for games with maximally and finite
asymmetric initial condition respectively).
It follows that
|ν ′(TΓ)− ν ′inv| ≤ ǫ
and
i) if |y(0)| → ∞
lim
N→∞
T
|y(0)|2
=
m′
ǫΓ
, (8)
ii) if limN→∞
N ′
N = γ, where 0 < γ ≤ 1, N
′ = # {yi : yi(0) 6= 0} and |y(0)| <∞,
m′′
ǫΓ
≤ lim
N→∞
T
|y(0)|2
≤ lim
N→∞
m′′
ǫΓ
|cy(0)|
N
“
1
βγ
−1
”
+ 2
βγ
+ 2
βγ
2
N
2
−1
−2
, (9)
iii) under same conditions of point ii) with βγ = 1
lim
N→∞
T
|y(0)|2
=
m′′
ǫΓ
, (10)
where m′ and m′′ are positive constants.
Proof
i) By Corollary 3.2, for N sufficiently large,
T =
(
m′
ǫ
(
1 + |cy(0)|l
)) 1k+1
− 1
Γ
,
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where m′ is a positive constant, 0 < k < 2N
2
−1
and 2k + 2 < l < 2 + 4N
2
−2
.
In the limit N →∞ we obtain c = 1, k = 0 and l = 2; it follows that
lim
N→∞
T
|y(0)|2
=
m′
ǫΓ
. (11)
ii) By Corollary 3.4
(
m′′
ǫ
(
1 + |cy(0)|2k+2
)) 1k+1
− 1
Γ
< T <
(
m′′
ǫ
(
1 + |cy(0)|
N
“
1
βγ
−1
”
+ 2
βγ
+ 2
βγ
2
N
2
−1
))
− 1
Γ
,
and (9) follows.
iii) Since 0 < k <
(
N
2 + 1
) (
1
βγ − 1
)
+ 1βγ
2
N
2
−1
and 2k + 2 < l < N
(
1
βγ − 1
)
+ 2βγ +
2
βγ
2
N
2
−1
, in the limit N →∞ we obtain c = 1, k = 0, l = 2 and (10) follows from (9).

Since, if the initial condition is finite, |y(0)|2 = O(N) and since PN = α > 0, from point
iii) of Proposition 3.8 it follows that T = O( PαΓ).
4 Conclusions
By applying the Veretennikov’s Theorem to the continuum time version of the MG, we
have obtained an upper bound for the asymptotic behavior, as the number of agents grows
to infinity, of the waiting time for reaching the stationary state in the asymmetric phase
(α > αc).
Since Veretennikov’s Theorem gives a sufficient condition for the existence of an in-
variant measure and it applies only to stochastic differential equations with not null initial
condition, the waiting time obtained may not be the smallest one (it is an upper bound)
and it holds only for a MG with asymmetric initial condition. The fewer are the agents with
initial asymmetry in evaluating their strategies, the stronger must be their asymmetry:
if their number is o(N), then at least one agent must have maximally initial asymmetry
(|yi(0)| = ∞), while if their number is O(N) the initial asymmetry must be inversely
proportional to their fraction with respect to the agents population size (βγ = 1). It
follows that the single-agent’s weakest initial asymmetry allowed by our result is xi such
that xi tanh(xi) = 1 (xi ≈ 1.2), corresponding to a game where all the agents (γ = 1)
have asymmetric initial condition. Our result is simply not applicable to a game with
initial asymmetry weaker than the previous one. It is worth to note that the limit we
have derived agrees with the rule of thumb in performing numerical simulations to wait a
number of time steps proportional to PαΓ in order to reach the stationary state and that,
being T = O( PαΓ), the time to equilibrium increases as α > αc goes toward αc.
5 Appendix
Consider the n-dimensional stochastic differential equation
dX(t) = b(X(t))dt + σ(X(t))dW (t)
X(0) = x ∈ Rn,
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either with initial data X(0) = x ∈ Rn.
W (t) is an m-dimensional Wiener process with m ≥ n, b is a locally bounded Borel
function from Rn with values on Rn and σ a bounded continuous non-degenerate matrix
n × m-function and suppose that the drift term satisfies the following condition: there
exist constants M0 ≥ 0 and r > 0 such that〈
b(x),
x
|x|
〉
≤ −
r
|x|
, |x| ≥M0. (12)
Theorem 5.1 (Veretennikov,[13]) Under assumption (12) with r > n2 + 1, for any
0 < k < r − n2 − 1, with l ∈ (2k + 2, 2r − n),
|µx(t)− µinv| ≤ c(1 + |x|
l)(1 + t)−(k+1),
where |µx(t)− µinv| is the total variation distance between µx(t) and µinv, c is a positive
constant, µx(t) is the distribution of Xt, x being the initial data, and µinv is the invariant
measure for Xt; in particular µinv does exists.
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